





Water Markets and Third Party Effects  
 
 Jean-Marc Bourgeon
                K. William Easter 













Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 
International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, 







Copyright 2006 by Rodney Smith, K. William Easter and J. Bourgeon. All rights 
reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 WATER MARKETS AND THIRD PARTY EFFECTS  
 
Introduction 
As water scarcity increases, so does the  interest in using market mechanisms to allocate water. 
To date, market mechanisms have found an occ asional home, with most trade occurring among 
users within a water district and within the same use category, e.g., farmer to farmer trades. In 
Chile water markets exist in select areas  in the north and within small river basins (Bauer, 1998), 
and trading there has bee n mostly among irrigators. Limited trades between i rrigators and the 
urban sector have oc curred, but these trades did not involve fallowing or retiring land. Northern 
Colorado has an active market but most of t he trading is among farmers in the same water 
district. Little trade has  occurred among water districts or watersheds or among different types of 
uses (irrigation vs. urban use). Two notable exceptions are t he California Water Bank and the 
Colorado/Big Thompson project (Easter  and Archibald, 2001). Although the California Water 
Bank has moved large quantities of water over long distances and among different uses, it is not 
a true market in that  prices are fixed by the government and do not adjust to supply and demand 
forces. Prices are determined by market forces in the Colorado/Big Thompson project, but the 
trading has involved small amounts of water as compared to California Wat er Bank trades. 
One explanation for the dearth of water markets and trading is the belief that water market 
expansion engenders losses in local business income. The a rgument goes as follows. If water 
markets open up and water  has a higher value outside of agriculture, then farmers will sell their 
water to urban users or t o irrigators outside the local district. If a significant number of farmers 
export their water, irrigation falls, land retirement increases and agricultural product ion falls. The 
resulting drop in production causes a decrease in local demand for agricultural inputs and 
processing services, which reduces demand for local business services. I n addition to finding disfavor among local businesses, farmers who remain in agriculture would likely not favor water 
trading because such trades are  believed to have negative impacts on agricultural land prices 
(Haddad, 2000). 
Given the beliefs above, it is not unusual to see l ocal businesses voice opposition to water 
trading. Howitt and Vaux (1995) have suggested that because of the impacts of water tr ades on 
local business, California may need to limit water sold from each county. This would prevent 
sales from being concentrat ed in just a few counties. The State of California took t he suggestion 
somewhat further and banned all water sales ba sed on land fallowing. Such restrictions appeared 
to satisfy many local business concerns. However, wholesale resistance to water t rading is not 
necessarily the best course of action to take. For instance, in the W estlands Water District in 
central California, irrigators first opposed interdistrict water transfers. As water  trading 
developed, however, local markets expanded and revealed the p otential benefits from water 
trading. Local resistance then turned to support (Easter and Archibald, 2001). The resistance to 
water trading by local businesses and farmers, combined with the W estlands Water District 
experience suggests we should examine more closely the potential impact of water tra ding on 
local/regional economies. 
Past empirical papers have argued water tra ding has both improved and hurt local 
economies - see Howe and Goemans (2003). This paper attempts to tie these stories together 
with a common conceptual underpinning. We develop a formal analytical model that he lps 
examine the (general equilibrium) economic impacts of water market creation on a small, but 
open, rural economy with heterogenous land quality. Given farmers have appropriativ e rights to 
a water resource, we consider the impact of placing -- or removing -- water trading restrictions 
on: farmer and service sector  income, and household welfare. The model assumes a subset of agents can potentially leave the region and take their i ncome with them -- income  flight. 
We show that with, or without, income flight, water trading unambiguously improves per 
capita regional welfare, but with income flight can lead to a decrea se in aggregate regional 
income. The impact of water trading on ser vice and land rental values is ambiguous. However, at 
least one stakeholder group (farmers or service providers) is always hurt with water tra ding. 
Likewise, someone always benefits. In other words, water tr ading triggers a natural conflict 
between farmer and service sector stakeholders.  With no income flight, when the share of 
household income spent on services is large relative to the cost share of service s in agricultural 
production, the service sect or benefits from water trading: otherwise agriculture b enefits. If 
income flight is an issue, and the share of agents migrating out of the region is large enough, the 
service sector likely looses with increased water trading. Hence, the model provides conceptual 
support for why agricultural service providers a nd farmers might, indeed, be concerned with 
water trading.  
Section 2 presents the basic model and Section 3 examines the  model’s equilibrium 
properties. Section 4 calibrates the model to a social acc ounting matrix and examines the impact 
of water trading on agricultural and service sector income. The last section concludes.  
The Model 
Consider a small rural economy with two productive sectors: agriculture and services. 
Agriculture produces a traded composite good y
a, while the service sector produces a non-traded 
composite good y
s. Agricultural production requires land, water, services, and labor, while 
service production requires labor and region/sector specific capital  K, where K = 1. Local 
production does not affect th e agricultural good’s price, pa, which we normalize to 1. The service 
good is used either for  (household) consumption in the region (e.g., restaurants, movies, health care, etc.), or as an input for agricultural production (implement repairs, fertilizer, pesticides, 
etc.). Being a non-traded good, the service good price  ps is endogenous. 
Economic agents in the region are represented b y a continuum with total mass normalized to one. 
Each agent is endowed with a single unit each of labor, land and water, and an equal share of 
capital K. Agents earn revenues by either producing the agricultural commodity, or by producing 
services and possibly selling water outside the r egion. Households use revenue to purchase the 
agricultural commodity, services, and a composite import good. Local consumption of  the 
composite good does not affect its price, denoted  pm. The total water endowment of the region is 
normalized to one and if sold outside the re gion, is sold at the ongoing price pw. 
Production and consumption 1 
The service good is produced using labor and  capital K. Let l
d denote the region’s aggregate 
demand for service labor. Then net service sector revenue (r ents to capital) is given by  
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where w is the wage rate, and  f(∙) is a differentiable, non-decreasing and concave function. Given 
the properties of f(∙), the indirect function G
s(∙) is continuous and convex in w and ps. By 
Hotelling's lemma, service sector labor demand is  
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Land quality is heterogeneous and indexed by  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ a : the worst quality land  is indexed 
, 0 = a  the best quality land is indexed  1 = a . Nature randomly assigns a unique land quality to 
each agent, and we index each agent by the parameter  㬐.  Irrigated agricultural production requires the  following inputs in fixed proportion: a unit 
of labor, a unit of water, 㰐 units of the service good and a unit of land. Such an application of 
inputs to the unit of land at location  㬐 yields output  ( ) . a a f =  Since there is only unit of each 
quality land, agricultural output at location  㬐 is either 0 or 㬐.  
Let pa represent the per-unit price of the agricultural good. The economic rent of land at 
location 㬐 is  
^ ￿ J ￿=paJ?￿ _ ps + w + pw￿ ,   #   
 
and is the market value of irrigated agricultural production of land quality  㬐 less the market value 
of the productive inputs.
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1Alternatively, one could view land as having two possible uses: it can be irrigated to produce a 
high valued product with per-unit price  a p  , or it can be used to produce a dry -land agricultural 
product with per-unit price  a
d
a p p <  . Dry-land agricultural production only requires land, while 
irrigated agriculture requires land, labor, water, and a service input. In such a case sett ing  0 = d
a p  
will not change any of the results that f ollow. 
 
 where, suppressing the constant prices  pa and pm, e(ps) is the unit expenditure f unction, typically 
interpreted as a cost of living index.  
Water management practices: quantity restricti ons and subsidies 
An agent either farms his or her parcel, or abandons the land to join the service sector. The 
resulting labor allocation across agricultural and service production depe nds on incentives given 
by public regulations, and on the allocation of water property rights. In the Western U.S., water 
rights are typically appropriative use, with a first in time, first in right clause. As noted above, 
here, farmers have appropriative water rights.  
Consider a policy that restricts the share of water a f armer can sell outside the region. 
Represent the level of this policy by the  exogenous water trading parameter [ ]. 1 , 0 ˛ s  When 㰰 = 0 
water trading is not allowed, and when 㰰 = 1 full water trading is allowed. If 㰰 = 0.5, only half of 
the available water is tradeable and the effective per -unit value of water in trade is  㰰pw.  
With the policy parameter set at 㰰, the type-㬐 agent's income as a farmer is  pa - 㰐ps (a 
self-employed farmer who does not pay for water). As a laborer, the agent earns  㰰pw in water 
income and w in wages. Then, the type -㬐 agent exits agriculture  if  , w s p w p s r a + £ -  or if  
(1)          . w s I p w p s r a a + + ” £  
Here 㬐I denotes the agent who is indifferent between far ming and working in the service secto r. 
One result of expression (1) is agriculture uses  1 - 㬐I  units of labor, and the  remaining agents 
work in the service sector. 
The farmer's income, , s p r a -  is different from the (true) ec onomic rent from farming 
㰀(㬐), and condition (1) is equivalent to  
, 0 ) 1 ( ) ( > - + w p s a p  
i.e., the true profit from farming augmented by a per-unit water subsidy, ( ) w p s - 1 .  Aggregate revenue under the above  policy comes from three sources: land rents, service 
sector profits, and water income. Define aggregate land rents by   
( ) . ) ( ,
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A fraction  I a - 1  of agents use their share of water f or farming and thus their true economic 
profit is increased by w p , the cost of water they do not pay. The other fraction of agents  㬐I  are 
only entitled to sell a fraction s  of their water endowment, which corresponds to each seller 
earning w p s on the water market. Then aggregate water rents are  
( ) ( ) . 1 , I w I w s p p p WR sa a s + - =  
Then, for given levels of  ps, w, and water trading restrictions  , s  regional aggregate income  is 
equal to  
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Policy Analysis 
This section examines the impact of water tr ading on: regional welfare; aggregate regional 
income and its distribution acro ss agricultural and service providers ; labor shares across 
agricultural and service production ; and the service price and land rental values.  We assume 
labor moves freely in and out of the region, and from the standpoint of the region, the 
equilibrium wage rate is exogenous and equal to . w  
Figure 1 depicts labor market  equilibrium with exogenous wage . w  Here, the region’s 
labor endowment is normalized to 1. For   , * = s s p p  the service labor supply function is the 
upward sloping line   ( ), w s
s p p l w s r + - = *  and the service sector’s inverse labor demand is  
( ). ,l p W w s
* =  Given ( ), , , , w p w s r  if the equilibrium service price is , *
s p  then the equilibrium level 
of service labor supply is , * s l  the level of service labor demand is ( ), ,l p W l l s
s s
d
d * * = =  while * * * - = - = I
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In this case there is an excess supply of service labor in the region, and   * * - s
d
s l l  units of 
labor obtain employment outside the region (e.g., rural residents commute or mo ve to the city). 
If, however, the equilibrium service price were  * * * > s s p p  and the corresponding regional service 
labor demand and service supply functions were given by the dashed  functions  ( ) l p W s , * *  and 
w s
s p p l w s r - - = * *  respectively, then there is an exc ess demand for service labor and urban 
residents would commute/move to the countryside.  In what follows, we ignore the latter case. 
Of course, our current an alysis implicitly assumes commuting costs are zero. 
As noted above, we focus only on the case where there  exists an excess supply of labor in 
the rural sector, and t hat a share of the agents not finding employment there, leave and find 
employment elsewhere.  When agents leave the region they take their l abor and water income 
with them. The amount of labor that potentia lly leaves the region is equal to  
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , w p G p w p w p G p ES s
s
w w s s
s
w I s + + + = + = s r a s  where ( ) s p ES  is the excess supply of service labor for the re gion. Assume an exogenous fixed 
proportion, [ ], 1 , 0 ˛ g  of the excess service labor supply leaves the region . Then the value of 
income leaving the region is equal to   
(3)          ( ) ( ) . 0 , £ + - s s g s w p ES p w  
Regional expenditures when  ( ) s g , s p ES  agents leave the re gion is now  equal to 
(4)        ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] s g g g g
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1 :  is the uniform density over the interval  [ ], 1 , ES g  and  
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is the expected value of regional utility. The variable  g u  is the average utility of a typical agent 
remaining in the region.  
With income flight, aggregate demand for consumption services is given by   
(5)        ( ) ( ) [ ]. , 1 ) ( , s g g g s s s
c p ES u p e u p x - ¢ =  
Given expressions (2) – (5), a competitive e quilbrium is:  
 Definition A competitive equilibrium with pote ntial income flight, water trading restrictions  a  , 
and open labor markets is characterized by a service price  ps
D and welfare level ᚰD such that (i) 
the service good market clears, i.e.   
Gp
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D,w # ￿=ev ￿ ps
D￿ ᚰL
D￿ 1 ?L ES￿ ps
D,a ￿ ￿ + _ ￿ 1 ?J I￿ ps
D￿ ￿ ,
 
holds, and (ii) aggregate expenditure is equal to aggregate income   
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where  ( ) . w s s I p w p p s r a + + ” * *   Due to space restrictions, we skip a formal presentation of the impact of relaxing water trading 
restrictions on per capita utility,  the service price a nd income distribution. Instead, we summarize 
the major results. 
Results:  
(i) Nominal regional income can decrease with increase d water trading: especially with income 
flight; Per capita welfare increases with increased water trading: with or without water trading;   
(ii) The service price can increa se or decrease with wate r trading. The general rule of thumb is: if 
the share of regional income spent on consumer based services is large (small) enoug h relative to 
the cost share of services in agricultural production, the service price increases (decreases) with 
increased water trading;  
(iii) Typically farmers win (lose) when the service p rice falls (increases); service providers lose 
(win) when the service price falls (increases); agricul tural service providers almost always lose. 
Thus, a natural conflict e merges between farming and service sector stakeholders;   
(iv) Aggregate land rents can increase or decrease with water trading, as can individual land 
rents. Indirect service price effec ts influence greatly this result.   
A Calibrated Version of the Model  
The above model, combined with calibration tec hniques yield an empirical model with great 
potential for assessing the likely impact of water trading on a small regional economy.
2 The 
results above suggest without income flight, the impact of water tra ding on stakeholders depends 
on whether the service price increases or decrea ses with water trading. The Appendix  provides a 
modified social accounting matrix (SAM), of an undisclosed country, for which the share of 
household income spent on services is large relative to service's share of cost in  producing 
                                                   
2Details of the calibration process a re available upon request. 
 agricultural outputs. Table 1 presents equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income 
associated with  the SAM in the appendix assuming  no income flight. The table introduces two 
additional variables: agricultural based services,  G
sa(∙), and household based services,  G
sh(∙).  
1.9191 -0.3312 0.201 0.01578 -0.0412 0.1032 0.0988 0.0091
% change
0 to 1
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Table 1. Equilibrium parameter values and stakehol der income: No income flight
1.9191 -0.3312 0.201 0.01578 -0.0412 0.1032 0.0988 0.0091
% change
0 to 1
16639 8073 27159 35232 6591 119739 40879 1.0091 1
0.8756 -0.165 0.0973 0.006 0.0188 0.0491 0.0475 0.0035
% change
0 to 0.5
10691 10079 24814 34893 7003 113863 38969 1.0035 0.5
5700 12071 22613 34684 6874 108536 37202 1 0
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Table 1. Equilibrium parameter values and stakehol der income: No income flight
 
Going from no water trading to allowing 50% water tra ding can increase  the service price 
by as much as 9.9%, while aggregate regional income aggregate income G increases as much as 
10.3%. The service price increase occurs because the percentage increase in household service 
demand is greater than the percentage decre ase in agricultural service demand. Given the price 
increases, aggregate service sector profits increa se by 1.6% with full water trad ing, while 
agricultural service providers lose up to 33.1%. Finally, observe that for  㰰 = 0.05 the region gains 
about 5327 in income. With homothetic preferences,  consumer based service income increases 
by 0.44*5327=2343.9, while the value of household imports increase by  1331.8. Agricultural 
service providers lose 1938, yielding a net gain to the service sector of 209. The agricultural 
sector gains 129.   
Table 2 presents equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income associated with 
the appendix SAM under partial income flight, with 㬰 = 0.5. 0.8390 -0.1633 0.0551 -0.0261 0.0450 0.0115 0.0568 -0.0152
% change:
0 to 0.5
10819 9946 21197 31143 7685 99474 41948 0.9396 0.5
5883 11887 20090 31977 7354 98345 39693 0.9541 0
WR Gsa Gsh Gs Ga G ps s
Table 2. Equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income: ? = 0.5
0.8390 -0.1633 0.0551 -0.0261 0.0450 0.0115 0.0568 -0.0152
% change:
0 to 0.5
10819 9946 21197 31143 7685 99474 41948 0.9396 0.5
5883 11887 20090 31977 7354 98345 39693 0.9541 0
WR Gsa Gsh Gs Ga G ps s
Table 2. Equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income: ? = 0.5
 
Here, the service price falls, and accord ingly, the agricultural sector benefits, while agricultural 
service providers lose. Also, the loss in agricultural service revenues dominate the increased 
income realized by providers of consumption based services. Overall, however, the  region gains 
1.15% in nominal aggregate revenue. In Table 3, similar results hold, with t he significant 
difference relative to Table 2 being nominal aggregate income falls by 4.8% . Simulations show 
that with full income flight, nominal aggregate income would fall by more tha n 11%. 
0.7971 -0.1671 -0.0145 -0.0761 0.0806 -0.0484 0.0825 -0.0447
% change:
0 to 0.5
10984 9669 16881 26550 8617 82110 47361 0.8568 0.5
6112 11609 17129 28738 7974 86286 43750 0.8969 0
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Table 3. Equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income: ? = 1
0.7971 -0.1671 -0.0145 -0.0761 0.0806 -0.0484 0.0825 -0.0447
% change:
0 to 0.5
10984 9669 16881 26550 8617 82110 47361 0.8568 0.5
6112 11609 17129 28738 7974 86286 43750 0.8969 0
WR Gsa Gsh Gs Ga G ps s
Table 3. Equilibrium parameter values and stakeholder income: ? = 1
 
Conclusion 
There has been growing concern  about the health of rural economies, and with impact of policies 
designed to address concerns in one sector, but affecting others, e.g., the impact of water trading 
on service sector income. This paper dev elops a model where the rural economy is endowed with 
labor, water and heterogeneous land, and uses these inputs to produce a tr adeable agricultural 
commodity and a non-traded composite service good. Here, the service good can be co nsumed 
directly or used as an  intermediate input in agricultural production.  
The model generated the following analytical results: (i) with no income flight the direct effect of water trading on nominal regional income was always strictly positive, while with 
income flight the direct effect could be negative.  Income flight increase s the chance that water 
trading will t rigger a decrease in the  service price, and hence, likely benefits the agricultural 
sector. (ii) Water trading can lead to an increase or decrease in  the service good price. (iii) If the 
service price falls: (iii.a) the sect or providing household consumption services may or may not 
benefit from water trading, while agricultural service providers defin itely lose with increased 
levels of water trading and (iii.b) aggregate agricultural rents increase. (iv) Irrespective of the 
impact of water trading on the se rvice price, per capita regional welfare improves with increased 
water trading, and nominal income likely increases. Hence, with water trading at lea st one group 
of regional stakeholders will be hurt by increasing water tra ding levels. 
Water trading can certainly lead to a decrea se in nominal regional income, but its 
presence does not automatically signal disaster for the region. In fact, the per capit al welfare of 
those remaining in the region increases with increased water trading. Third party fears of water 
trading, however, are justified: Farmers should welcome water trading if such trading leads to a 
decrease in their input costs. Service sector pr oviders should welcome water trading if it leads to 
an increase in the service price. I f income flight is of concern, however, the  service sector would 
have cause for concern if the share o f migrants leaving the region is significantly greater than 
one half: in this case, service prices are likely to fall  as would service sector income . If income 
flight is a concern, water tax es combined with income transfers could slow the exodous of 
income from the region. 
The simple model presented here  can serve as a point of departure to examine several 
other questions. For example, what is the effect of water  trading on service income and 
environmental quality, or what policy instruments could/should be used  to minimize losses to the service sector and minimize losses in environmental quality and biodiversity.  
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